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I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic struck the United States in early 2020.1 The
coronavirus prompted public health mandates without precedent for at least 
a century.2  Some states almost entirely locked down.3  These measures
* © 2020 Daniel Farber.  Sho Sato Professor of Law. Amanda Tyler provided helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.  Jetta Cook provided invaluable research assistance. 
1. Cases in the U.S., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https:// 
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/ 
3W4M-ZS9N].
2. See, e.g., Quarantine and Isolation: History of Quarantine, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/historyquarantine.html 
[https://perma.cc/FE65-YFE6].
3. See, e.g., Cal. Exec. Order No. N-33-20 (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.gov.ca. 
gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-
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inevitably impinged on activities that the Constitution would normally
protect. In confronting these cases, many courts have turned to a 1905
Supreme Court case decision, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,4 often considered
the leading case in public health law.5  There is little agreement, however, 
about how that decision fits into the current framework of constitutional 
law. As a result, courts have differed widely in the degree of deference 
they give public health authorities.6 
This Article attempts to bring light to bear on this dispute.  It begins by 
placing Jacobson in historical context and exploring how later Supreme 
Court cases make use of it.  History undermines the argument for giving
Jacobson talismanic significance in public health emergencies.  The Article
then examines how courts have applied Jacobson in abortion and religious 
freedom cases during the current pandemic.  Some courts view Jacobson
as virtually a blank check for government actions;7 others apply standard
constitutional doctrines with little heed of the emergency.8 
Finally, the Article attempts to provide some guidance about how courts 
should approach judicial review during the emergency.9  The best analogy 
seems to be found in national security cases dealing with free speech.10 
ORDER.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z72L]; see also N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202 (Mar. 7, 2020), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2626-ENLJ]. 
4.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
5. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power 
and Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 576 (2005) (Jacobson is “often 
regarded as the most important judicial decision in public health.”). 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. See, e.g., In re Abbott (Abbott IV), 956 F.3d 696, 703 (5th Cir. 2020). 
8. See, e.g., Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020). 
9.  This Article focuses on how courts should approach cases involving rights that 
normally receive heightened scrutiny.  It does not address issues of public health law involving 
other kinds of personal liberty, such as personal mobility, which is limited during quarantines, 
and bodily integrity, which is limited by vaccination mandates.  Gostin argues that courts 
have used Jacobson as the basis for a balancing test in those cases that in practice favors 
the government.  Gostin, supra note 5, at 580. 
10. There is a vigorous debate on the general subject of executive powers during
emergencies.  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: 
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 4–5, 47–48 (2007) (arguing for virtually unrestricted 
executive power with little or no judicial or legislative oversight); Oren Gross, The Normless 
and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the “Norm- 
Exception” Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825, 1826 (2000) (critiquing a philosopher 
advocating authoritarian rule); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks 
Executive, 90 TEX. L. REV. 973, 973–74 (2012) (critiquing Posner & Vermeule).  Experience 
under the coronavirus indicates that courts have given state executives wide leeway but
have not abdicated their role.  See, e.g., In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1032 (8th Cir. 2020).  
Courts have also stressed the short-term nature of restrictions.  See infra Part III. For 
a comparative international survey, concluding that non-executive institutions have played 
an important role during the pandemic, see Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound 
834
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Like outbreaks of dangerous diseases, national security threats pose the
need for decisive government precautions, often in the face of great
uncertainty.11 The courts do not abandon normal constitutional tests in 
national security cases.12  In applying those tests, however, they give substantial
deference to the judgment of the responsible government officials.13  A
similar approach should govern in public health emergencies. 
II. THE CASE AND ITS EVOLVING INTERPRETATION
Jacobson needs to be understood in the context of constitutional 
development since the late nineteenth century.  The case was decided in
an era when the Supreme Court carefully scrutinized all government 
regulation to determine its reasonableness.14  Often, the Court found 
that regulation was unwarranted.15  In the case that became emblematic of 
this era, Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a New York law limiting 
bakers to a sixty-hour work week.16  The Court concluded that the law
unreasonably interfered with the freedom of bakery employees to work 
longer hours.17  The Lochner era reached its peak in the early 1930s as
part of an effort to block New Deal legislation.18 
Executive: Emergency Powers During the Pandemic (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper No. 2020-52, Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 7472020, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3608974 [https://perma.cc/V27R-4NYH].  For a survey of state 
laws governing use of executive power in emergencies, see Benjamin Dela Rocco et al., 
State Emergency Authorities to Address COVID-19, LAWFARE (May 4, 2020, 3:03 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-emergency-authorities-address-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/
V66Q-U5FC].
11. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 4.
 12. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 10, at 973–74. 
13. Id. This approach also finds support in Home Building & Loan Association v. 
Blaisdell, where the Court upheld a restriction on remedies for mortgage default that would 
normally have violated the Contract Clause.  290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934).  The Court held that 
the restrictions were valid during the economic emergency posed by the Great Depression, 
but it did say that “the relief afforded and justified by the emergency, in order not to 
contravene the constitutional provision, could only be of a character appropriate to that 
emergency and could be granted only upon reasonable conditions.”  Id. 
 14. See DANIEL FARBER & NEIL S. SIEGEL, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
258–59 (2019).
15. Id. at 256–59. 
16.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905), overruled in part, Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); see FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 258–59. 
17. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62–64. 
18. FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 260.
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The Supreme Court beat a hasty about-face in 1937 and adopted a new 
approach to constitutional law.19  Today, most regulations are subject to 
what is called “rational basis” review.20  Rather than asking whether laws
regulating the economy were reasonable, the courts upheld these laws 
unless they found no rational connection with any legitimate government 
purpose.21  Few if any laws failed this test.22  At the same time as it was
virtually eliminating its oversight of economic regulations, however, the 
Supreme Court became more vigilant in enforcing the Bill of Rights.23 
Thus, there is a two-part standard: most laws are subject to hardly any
judicial oversight, but courts carefully scrutinize laws involving fundamental 
rights such as free speech.24  This phase of development culminated in the
liberal Warren Court of the 1960s.25  Since the Warren Court, the Supreme 
Court has become increasingly conservative.26  In many areas, the effect 
has been to limit protection of individual rights, but there are exceptions 
such as free speech.27 
As the surrounding legal landscape has changed, the Court has also shifted
in the way that it utilizes Jacobson in opinions.  We begin with Jacobson 
itself, which the Supreme Court decided in the heyday of judicial suspicion 
of government regulation.28 We will then trace how the Court’s references 
to Jacobson have shifted over time. 
A. The Jacobson Case 
Boston suffered a major smallpox outbreak at the turn of the twentieth
century, with over fifteen hundred cases and almost three hundred deaths.29 
The outbreak began in May 1901.30  In Boston, there were free vaccination 
stations, and doctors visited businesses in order to offer vaccinations to 
19. Id. at 261. 
20. Id. at 263. 
21. Id. at 261–62. 
22. Id. at 263. 
23. Id. at 240–41. 
24. See Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative to
Multiple Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 384–85 (2018). 
25. FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 249.
 26. See id.
 27. Id. at 241–42. 
28. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 579.  For a recent nuanced discussion of Jacobson, 
see Wendy E. Parmet, Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19, 100 B.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 117 (2020). 
29. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER,
DUTY, RESTRAINT 121 (3d ed. 2016). 
30. Michael R. Albert, Kristen G. Ostheimer, & Joel G. Breman, The Last Smallpox 
Epidemic in Boston and the Vaccination Controversy, 1901–1903, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
375, 375 (2001). 
836
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combat the outbreak.31 When cases of the disease continued to emerge, 
doctors deployed to go door-to-door offering vaccinations.32  However,
police forced the homeless to be vaccinated because they were considered 
a disease reservoir.33  The last cases were reported in March 1903.34 
The outbreak sparked a bitter debate over vaccination.35  People we might
now call anti-vaxxers claimed that vaccination was a deadly risk to children.36 
At the time, states typically required vaccination of children for public 
school and used other indirect measures to encourage vaccination.37 
Massachusetts went a step further with a state law that empowered cities 
to mandate vaccination of all residents.38 
In 1902, the board of health in Cambridge, Massachusetts ordered all 
inhabitants to be vaccinated for smallpox.39  Although the campaign to
contain the disease in one part of the city initially seemed successful, it 
soon broke out all over Cambridge.40  Six individuals were prosecuted for 
refusing to be vaccinated, including Henning Jacobson and Albert Pear.41 
Jacobson was a Swedish Lutheran minister; Pear was the assistant city
clerk.42  Doctors considered vaccinating them to be medically safe, although 
Jacobson claimed to have had a bad reaction to a childhood vaccination.43 
The Massachusetts Anti-Compulsory Vaccination Society chose a lawyer
to represent Pear and Jacobson.44 
The Supreme Judicial Council—the state’s highest court—upheld the 
vaccination law.45  The court found it “too plain for discussion” that the 
goal of preventing smallpox was “worthy of the intelligent thought and 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. See id. at 376. 
 34.  Id. at 376 fig.1. 
35. Id. at 377. 
36. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 29, at 121. 
37. Id. at 122. 
38. Id. 
39. See Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 719–20 (Mass. 1903), aff’d sub nom. 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
40. See  KAREN L. WALLOCH, THE ANTIVACCINE HERESY: JACOBSON V. MASSACHUSETTS
AND THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF COMPULSORY VACCINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 76–78 
(2015).
41. Id. at 182. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 184. 
44. Id. at 189. 
45. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 722 (Mass. 1903), aff’d sub nom. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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earnest endeavor of legislators.”46  As to the defendants’ claims that vaccination 
was ineffective or dangerous, the court held that the trial judge would have 
been obligated to reject any evidence offered to support those claims.47 
The court stressed that “for nearly a century most of the members of the 
medical profession have regarded vaccination, repeated after intervals, as
a preventive of smallpox.”48  It added that physicians have considered any
possible risk as “too small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits 
coming from the discreet and proper use of the preventive.”49 The court then
upheld the law because it “relate[d] directly” to a proper legislative purpose.50 
With the assistance of a prominent lawyer chosen by the Anti-Compulsory 
Vaccination Society, Jacobson then appealed to the Supreme Court.51  In
retrospect, the Supreme Court seemed to be a favorable venue for Jacobson’s 
claim in 1905.52  Only two months after Jacobson, the Court decided Lochner 
v. New York,53 which became the symbol of an entire era in constitutional 
law.54  In his opinion for the Court striking down the New York maximum-
hours law, Justice Peckham charged the judiciary with determining whether 
a law was “a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power 
of the State . . . .”55  To pass muster under Lochner, the law must have more
than a remote bearing on public welfare: it must “have a more direct relation, 
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate.”56 
This approach gave courts freedom to second-guess the wisdom of economic 
regulation in the need of protecting “freedom of contract.”57 
Given what we know about the Lochner Court’s skepticism of government
regulation, it would not seem out of character for a majority to rule against
compulsory vaccination or at least rule that the defendants were entitled 
to a hearing in the trial court to determine the reasonableness of vaccination.58 
46. Id. at 720. 
47. Id. at 721. 
48. Id.
 49. Id.
50. Id. at 722. 
51. WALLOCH, supra note 40, at 196. 
52. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (asserting that there are limits
to the police power that a State may exercise). 
53. See id. at 45 (decided Apr. 7, 1905); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 
11 (1905) (decided Feb. 20, 1905). 
54. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992). 
55. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56. 
56. Id. at 57. 
57. Id. at 57–58. 
58. As to how the cases were distinguishable, the Lochner Court said only that the 
ruling in the Jacobson case was “far from covering the one now before the court.”  Id. at 
55–56. Perhaps a hint as to the distinction appears in the following passage: 
838
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Apparently, the author of the Lochner opinion, Justice Peckham, did think
that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional.59  He and another member 
of the future Lochner majority dissented without opinion in Jacobson.60 
They clearly thought that it was up to courts, not health authorities, to decide
on the need for vaccination.61  Several of the Justices who joined their later 
opinion in Lochner, however, apparently found Jacobson a more defensible 
exercise of government authority.62 
Justice Harlan, a future Lochner dissenter, wrote the majority opinion 
in Lochner.63  Harlan relied on the government’s “police power,” which 
he defined to include “such reasonable regulations established directly by 
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”64 
He then turned to the claim that the law was “unreasonable, arbitrary and 
oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman
to care for his own body and health in such a way as seems to him
best . . . .”65  Notwithstanding this individual interest, Harlan insisted that
“[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community 
has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens 
the safety of its members.”66  Referring to the military draft, he observed
that individuals could be forced into combat if needed to protect the 
It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for in this 
section of the statute under which the indictment was found, and the plaintiff in
error convicted, has no such direct relation to and no such substantial effect upon 
the health of the employee, as to justify us in regarding the section as really a 
health law.  It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to
regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employees (all being men,
sui juris), in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any
real and substantial degree, to the health of the employees. 
Id. at 64.  Thus, it appears that the majority did not consider the law before it to be a good
faith effort to protect health and was instead a disguised effort to regulate employment 
contracts in the interest of fairness. 
59. See id. at 52; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (Peckham, 
J., dissenting).
60. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (Brewer, J. and Peckham, J., dissenting). 
61. See id.
 62. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67–68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
63. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.  Ironically, by the time the Supreme Court decided
the case, the vaccination order had probably expired and the epidemic had ended, so Jacobson 
probably never had to get vaccinated.  See WALLOCH, supra note 40, at 211–12. 
64. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. 
65. Id. at 26. 
66. Id. at 27. 
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community from danger.67  Whatever medical controversy might exist 
about vaccination, the legislature was entitled to decide between conflicting 
theories rather than leaving this judgment to a court or jury.68 
Justice Harlan provided several different formulations for the standard 
of judicial review.  One formulation that became influential applied broadly 
to any statute purportedly enacted to protect public health, morals, or safety.69 
The law is unconstitutional if it has “no real or substantial relation to those 
objects.”70  Otherwise, it is unconstitutional only if it is “beyond all question, a
plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law . . . .”71 
Soon afterwards, Justice Harlan used this language from Jacobson to explain
why Lochner was wrongly decided,72 showing that he did not regard this
test as specific to epidemics or emergency situations. 
Elsewhere, the Jacobson opinion dismissed the right of a minority to 
block actions authorized by statute and “acting in good faith,” at least “in
any city or town where smallpox is prevalent.”73  That formulation seems 
both narrower, in that it seems limited to smallpox or similar diseases, and 
broader, in that only “good faith” is required of government authorities.74 
Finally, Justice Harlan seemed to recognize that a facially valid law might 
be unconstitutional as applied to an individual whose medical condition 
67. Id. at 29. 
68. Id. at 30. 
69. Id. at 31.  Note that Harlan did not limit this test to emergencies, epidemics, or 
public health cases. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting). After
quoting Jacobson, Harlan continued: 
If the end which the legislature seeks to accomplish be one to which its power 
extends, and if the means employed to that end, although not the wisest or best, 
are yet not plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then the court cannot 
interfere.  In other words, when the validity of a statute is questioned, the burden 
of proof, so to speak, is upon those who assert it to be unconstitutional. 
Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).  Later in his Lochner dissent, 
Harlan again called on Jacobson for support: 
I find it impossible, in view of common experience, to say that there is here no 
real or substantial relation between the means employed by the State and the end 
sought to be accomplished by its legislation. . . . Still less can I say that the 
statute is, beyond question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the 
fundamental law. 
Id. at 69–70 (first citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), then citing Jacobson, 
197 U.S. at 31). 
73. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37. 
74. Id. 
840
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would make it “cruel and inhuman in the last degree,” although he construed
the Massachusetts law not to apply in those circumstances.75 
The factual setting of the case made it unnecessary for Justice Harlan to 
focus closely on the scope of review.  There was no dispute that smallpox
was a dire threat to the community or that vaccination was the commonly
accepted medical response.76  This made it unnecessary to decide just how
much leeway local authorities had to respond. 
Finally, it was not altogether clear how much Jacobson extended beyond
public health emergencies.  It might be seen as upholding all public health
measures, all emergency measures—including those in wartime—or even
all exercises of the state’s police power. Or it might be limited to epidemics 
as a well-established special case in terms of the exercise of the police
power. Whatever the Court originally had in mind about these issues in 
Jacobson, the surrounding constitutional landscape changed substantially 
in the decades after the decision.77  Those changes raised the question whether
Jacobson survived in the form of a special test for certain public health 
cases or whether it was subsumed under general constitutional standards 
that evolved later.78 
B. Evolving Supreme Court Interpretations 
Jacobson saw immediate use in another vaccination case.  A decade 
after Jacobson, the Supreme Court upheld a school vaccination mandate 
in Zucht v. King.79  There, the Court upheld a Texas law requiring all children
to be vaccinated to go to school.80  “Long before this suit was instituted,”
Justice Brandeis said in his brief opinion for the Court, “Jacobson . . . had 
settled that it is within the police power of a State to provide for compulsory 
vaccination.”81 He added: “That case and others had also settled that a State
may, consistently with the Federal Constitution, delegate to a municipality 
75. Id. at 38–39.  Gostin sees four themes in Jacobson relating to the assessing public
health measures: the necessity of responding to a threat to the community, choice of reasonable 
means, proportionality between means and ends, and avoidance of adverse side effects.  
Gostin, supra note 5, at 579. 
76. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28. 
77. Gostin, supra note 5, at 576–77. 
78. See id. at 578 tbl.1 (providing a useful tabulation of applications of Jacobson in
later cases). 
79.  Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922). 
80.  Id. at 175, 177. 
81. Id. at 176 (citation omitted). 
 841
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authority to determine under what conditions health regulations shall become
operative.”82 
Beyond vaccinations, Jacobson was also cited as support for a wide
range of public health and safety measures.  In the foundational zoning
case Euclid v. Amber Realty Company, it served as support for single-
family zoning intended in part to provide more healthful living conditions.83 
It was also used to uphold food and drug safety laws,84 coal mine safety 
laws,85 a law banning child labor in hazardous jobs,86 and medical licensing 
laws even in the absence of a professional consensus,87 among other
applications.  It was the sole citation in a legal opinion that has now become 
infamous: the ruling in Buck v. Bell, which upheld the forced sterilization 
of a woman said to have had a hereditary mental disability.88  Justice Holmes’s 
majority opinion cited Jacobson to support the following sentence: “The 
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover 
cutting the Fallopian tubes.”89  That sentence was followed by Holmes’s 
remark that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”90 
Jacobson was also cited as a basis for upholding laws with no public
health nexus. For instance, in Schmidinger v. Chicago, it was cited to establish
that police power encompassed a city ordinance regulating the weight of 
bread loaves.91 Jacobson also served as support for a law governing damage
awards by railroad employees,92 in a case involving insurance regulation,93 
and in a diverse set of other cases.94  In a case where the government’s
goal was to make train rides more peaceful, the Court quoted Jacobson at 
length to show that freedom of contract was limited by the state’s police 
82. Id. (citing Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910)). 
83. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379–80, 395 (1926) (citing Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30–31 (1905)). In another zoning case, Jacobson was deployed 
to uphold a local ordinance restricting billboards in a residential area.  See Thomas Cusack 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1917) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30). 
84. See, e.g., Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446, 451–52 (1915); Adams v. Milwaukee, 
228 U.S. 572, 581–82 (1913). 
85. See, e.g., Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1914) 
(citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25); Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26, 28–29 (1913). 
86. See Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913). 
87. See Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1912). 
88.  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–07 (1927) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11). 
89. Id. at 207 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11). 
90. Id. 
91. Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578, 582–83 (1913) (citing Jacobson, 
197 U.S. at 25, 31). 
92. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 
(1911).
93. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1911). 
94. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932) (trucking regulation);
Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597 (1926) (medicinal alcohol regulation); Welch v. 
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 (1909) (building height restriction). 
842
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power.95  Notably, Jacobson’s mention of military conscription was used
as authority for denying religious exemptions from military training96 and 
for denying citizenship to someone unwilling to bear arms in defense of 
the country.97 
Few if any of the cases involved emergency situations.  The exception 
was Sterling v. Constantin, where an emergency at least purportedly existed.98 
The Governor of Texas declared an emergency on the ground that certain
counties were in a state of turmoil and insurrection,99 apparently because
the bottom had dropped out of the oil market due to the Great Depression.  
After the National Guard was sent in, oil wells were shut down to prop up 
the price until a regulatory commission could rule.100  After the commission 
ruled and the troops were withdrawn, a federal court issued a temporary 
restraining order against the commission’s order.101  The Governor issued
orders limiting production, believing that the court had no jurisdiction 
over such emergency orders.102  Although the Court ultimately found the
Governor’s actions to be unjustified, it emphasized the broad scope of 
the Governor’s authority: 
In the performance of its essential function, in promoting the security and well-
being of its people, the State must, of necessity, enjoy a broad discretion. The
range of that discretion accords with the subject of its exercise. . . . As the State has
no more important interest than the maintenance of law and order, the power it confers 
upon its Governor as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of its military
forces to suppress insurrection and to preserve the peace is of the highest
consequence.103 
95. Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 85–86, 88 (1910) (quoting Jacobson, 197 
U.S. at 26). 
96. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264–65 (1934) (quoting
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29). 
97. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931) (quoting Jacobson, 197
U.S. at 29). 
98. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1932); cf. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 
328, 333 (1916) (upholding Florida law “drafting” men to work on public roads). 
99. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 389–90. 
100. Id. at 390. 
101. Id. at 387. 
102. Id. at 387–88. 
103. Id. at 398–99 (citations omitted) (first citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 198 
U.S. 11, 31 (1905); then citing Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 270 U.S. 582, 584 (1929); 
and Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930)). 
 843




   
 
  






















    
   
   
Nevertheless, the Court found that the Governor had acted outside of
his very broad discretion to quell an insurrection in restricting oil production 
outside of the normal legal process.104 
Jacobson also made a surprise appearance in a very different context.
Recall that the Jacobson Court suggested that the statute should not apply 
in circumstances where doing so would be inhumane.105 Sorrells v. United
States, a case familiar to criminal law teachers, used Jacobson as precedent 
in the very different setting of police entrapment.106 Jacobson served as 
part of a string cite for the proposition that a general criminal statute “may 
and should be limited where the literal application of the statute would 
lead to extreme or absurd results.”107 
It seems clear that courts thought Jacobson to be particularly relevant
to health and safety issues during this time period.108  It also spoke to the
need to uphold reasonable legislative judgments and the breadth of a state’s 
police power.109 Jacobson also emphasized the need for individuals to sacrifice 
for the common good.110  In short, it was a handy cite whenever the Court
wanted to uphold a legislative action. 
In the Lochner era, all state legislation was subject to judicial scrutiny 
for reasonableness.111  After 1937, the standard shifted from reasonableness
to the very lenient rational basis, so that it was no longer necessary to find 
special authority for health regulations or other public interest regulation.112 
At the same time, the Court began to apply a higher level of scrutiny to
government actions violating fundamental rights.113  In this period, Jacobson’s
significance changed.  It was frequently cited in cases involving religious 
freedom,114 most notably in Prince v. Massachusetts, where the Court rejected 
a religious exemption from child labor laws.115  It was also still cited, 
however, for broader propositions such as the breadth of government 
104. Id. at 401–02. 
105. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28–29. 
106.  Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932). 
107. Id. at 447–48 (quoting United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 362 (1926)). 
108. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
109. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. 
110. Id. at 26. 
111. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
112. See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 260–61. 
113. See Beschle, supra note 24, at 384–85. 
114. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 423 (1963) (majority distinguishing
cases involving public safety and dissent showing that religious exemptions are never 
required); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 250 (1963) (Brennan, 
J., concurring); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 32 n.9 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
115. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (citing Jacobson, 197 
U.S. 11); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). 
844
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power to act in emergencies,116 the state’s power to force individuals to
get treatment for drug addiction,117 the federal government’s power to 
strip citizenship from people who refuse military service,118 and limitations
on constitutional rights in the face of compelling interests.119 
Since the end of the Warren Court, Jacobson has continued to figure in 
cases involving the free exercise of religion,120 as well as a scattering of 
other cases.121 In a case dealing with hair styles of police officers, of all 
things, the Court cited Jacobson as support for using the rational basis 
test.122  However, it appears more frequently in two categories relating to
health care. The first category relates to confinement or compulsory treatment.  
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to 
confine mentally ill people who are not a threat to themselves or others.123 
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger emphasized, contrary to the court 
of appeals in the case, that confinement could be based on public safety, 
not merely on the need to provide treatment.124 Jacobson also surfaced in 
116. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). 
117. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664–65 (1962). 
118. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 121–22 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
119. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). 
120. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (citing Jacobson as the 
basis for a public safety exception from religious freedom); Gillette v. United States, 401 
U.S. 437, 461–62 (1971) (finding no constitutional right to religious exemption from military 
service). 
121. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997) (sexual predator
law); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (collection of evidence at the scene of 
a fire); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 & n.42 (1977) (corporal punishment in 
schools).
122. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. 11, 30–31, 35–37 (1905)).  Jacobson was one of two cases cited to support
putting the burden of proof on the challengers to “demonstrate that there is no rational 
connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county’s method of organizing its 
police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property.”  Id. (first citing United 
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 100–01 (1947); then citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 
30–31, 35–37).  The Court added: 
Neither this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position 
to weigh the policy arguments in favor of and against a rule regulating hairstyles 
as a part of regulations governing a uniformed civilian service.  The constitutional 
issue to be decided by these courts is whether petitioner’s determination that
such regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded 
“arbitrary,” and therefore a deprivation of respondent’s “liberty” interest in
freedom to choose his own hairstyle. 
Id. at 248 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)). 
123.  O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576–77 (1975). 
124. Id. at 582–83 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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Mills v. Rogers, a case involving the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs.125 
The majority opinion cited Jacobson as demonstrating the need to define 
a protected constitutional interest “as well as identification of the conditions
under which competing state interests might outweigh it.”126  Finally, in a
case dealing with the right to refuse medical treatment at the end of life, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on Jacobson as the basis for inferring a 
“constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment.”127  He described Jacobson as having “balanced an individual’s
liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State’s 
interest in preventing disease.”128 
The second group of citations involved abortion. In Roe v. Wade, as 
well as a companion case, Jacobson was cited as proof that the Constitution
does not recognize an absolute right to control one’s own body.129  It was 
later cited as support for the idea that a protected right can be limited by 
a compelling state interest130 and as indirectly supporting the view that
“the State’s interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any 
plenary override of individual liberty claims.”131  The most notable uses, 
however, were in two cases involving “partial birth abortion.”  In the first 
case, the Court quoted Jacobson at length to show that the state government 
could decide between contested medical or scientific positions;132 in the
second case, this was reformulated as a rule of deference to states in areas 
of scientific uncertainty.133 
What lessons can be distilled from this history?  In most modern cases, 
references to Jacobson were perfunctory, often as part of a string of citations,
giving the Court little reason for careful thought about the precedent’s 
implications.134  The Supreme Court seems not to have thought of Jacobson
as establishing a special rule for contagious diseases or providing a specific 
test for constitutionality.  Rather, it has found a variety of lessons from 
125.  Mills v. Rogers, 487 U.S. 291, 293 (1982). 
126. Id. at 299. 
127.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
128. Id. In dissent, Justice Brennan distinguished Jacobson on the grounds that the
vaccination program was a “‘paramount necessity’ to that State’s fight against a smallpox 
epidemic.”  Id. at 312 & n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905)); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37). 
130. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
808–09 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
131. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (citing
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)). 
132. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 971–72 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
133. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007). 
134. See, e.g., id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 857; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 (1909).
846
FARBER_57-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2020 4:02 PM     
  





















   
  
  
[VOL. 57:  833, 2020] Jacobson v. Massachusetts
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the case. Some of those lessons relate to subordinating individual interests 
such as religious freedom to collective necessities and respecting the 
individual interest in bodily integrity.135  There are also lessons about deference 
to reasonable legislation,136 to decisions by specialized agencies such as 
health boards,137 and to government actions in areas of scientific uncertainty.138 
An unspoken premise in these seems to have been that Jacobson was
obviously right about the need for forceful government action to stem a 
deadly epidemic.  Yet just what that premise means in terms of contemporary 
law seems to remain a bit indistinct. 
III. JACOBSON IN THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
By the beginning of this century, Jacobson was a relatively obscure case
except to specialists in public health.139 The coronavirus pandemic brought 
the century-old ruling into the limelight.140  Courts have not been able to
agree, however, on just what the case means for emergency public health 
regulations.  This dispute has led to circuit splits in cases dealing with 
restrictions on abortions and religious gatherings.141 The issues in these
two categories of cases are somewhat different, so they will be discussed 
separately below. 
A. Restrictions on Abortion 
Before examining the possible impact of the pandemic on abortion rights, 
it is first necessary to understand the protection those rights receive in 
normal times.142  Abortion has been one of the most fraught constitutional
135. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
139.  Joan Biskupic, The 115-Year-Old Supreme Court Opinion that Could Determine 




141. See, e.g., In re Abbott (Abbott IV), 956 F.3d 696, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2020)
(permitting temporary restrictions on abortions during a pandemic); Adams & Boyle, P.C. 
v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 917 (6th Cir. 2020) (denying temporary restrictions on abortion 
during a pandemic). 
142. For a more detailed presentation of the evolution of doctrine in this area, see 
FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 392–410. 
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issues of our time.143  In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution protected a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.144 The
Court allowed minimal abortion regulations in the first trimester of the 
pregnancy, regulations to protect the woman’s health in the second trimester, 
and almost complete bans in the third trimester, with an exception to 
protect the life or health of the pregnant woman.145 After new judicial
appointees by President Reagan, it was commonly expected that Roe would 
be overruled.146  Instead, in Casey, the Court reaffirmed the principle that 
abortion was constitutionally protected.147  However, it abandoned the
trimester-based standard for reviewing abortion regulations.  It adopted a
new test under which abortion regulations were valid unless they placed 
an “undue burden” on abortion.148  In a 2016 ruling, the Court clarified that 
the undue burden test required balancing the potential benefits of a regulation 
against the burden imposed on women seeking abortions.149 
Fast forward to 2020.  In the face of the initial surge in coronavirus cases, 
a number of states banned elective medical procedures.150  Those states 
took various stances with respect to abortion procedures.151  In New Jersey,
for instance, abortion procedures were specifically authorized.152  In several
143. See id. at 392–93. 
144.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
145.  See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 394. 
146. See id. at 399. 
147.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
148.  Id. at 874–75. 
149.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016). 
150.  See COVID-19: Executive Orders by State on Dental, Medical, and Surgical 
Procedures, AM. C. OF SURGEONS (June 8, 2020), https://www.facs.org/covid-19/legislative-
regulatory/executive-orders [https://perma.cc/CQ6T-HAW8].
151. See Sobel et al., State Action to Limit Abortion Access During the COVID-19 
Pandemic, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 25, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-
19/issue-brief/state-action-to-limit-abortion-access-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://
perma.cc/KJ9Z-5RHR]. 
152. See N.J. Exec. Order No. 109 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056
murphy/pdf/EO-109.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB79-V4S7].  Governor Murphy made “[e]xplicit 
exemption for family planning and termination of pregnancies” in Executive Order 109 
suspending elective surgeries.  Id.  Similarly, in Virginia, Governor Northam specifically 
excluded family planning services from restrictions of elective procedures in Executive 
Order of Public Health Emergency Two.  Va. Exec. Order of Pub. Health Emergency No. 
2 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-
actions/Order-of-Public-Health-Emergency-Two—Order-of-The-Governor-and-State-
Health-Commissioner.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7UP-3TJR].  Another example was the state
of Washington, where Governor Inslee made a specific exemption to family planning 
services within Proclamation 20-24, amending 20-05, which limited elective procedures 
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states, however, abortion procedures were included in bans on elective 
procedures.153  The circuits split on the validity of these restrictions.154 
Two circuits upheld the abortion restrictions.155  Both courts relied heavily
on Jacobson. In In re Abbott, the Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas executive 
order banning both surgical and medication abortions unless the woman’s 
health or life were in danger.156  The trial court had only entered a temporary 
restraining order (TRO),157 which is not normally appealable.158  The court 
of appeals leaped to the defense of the state restriction, using an extraordinary 
writ of mandamus to reverse the restraining order.159  According to the
appeals court, the trial judge had entered “an overbroad TRO that exceeds 
its jurisdiction, reaches patently erroneous results, and usurps the state’s 
authority to craft emergency public health measures ‘during the escalating 
COVID-19 pandemic.’”160 The court set out a three-part test based on 
Jacobson.161  Under this test, a state regulation during the pandemic is valid
if it (1) has “some ‘real or substantial relation’ to the public health crisis”; 
is (2) not “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured 
by the fundamental law”; and (3) provides “basic exceptions for ‘extreme 
cases,’ and [is not] . . . pretextual—that is, arbitrary or oppressive.”162 
Applying this lenient standard of review, the court upheld the Texas
Governor’s order because the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to 
reject the state’s rationale, which was that the law helps preserve personal
protective equipment such as masks for use in treating COVID-19 
153. See Sobel et al., supra note 151. 
154. See generally id.
155. See In re Abbott (Abbott IV), 956 F.3d 696, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2020); In re
Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1032 (8th Cir. 2020). 
156.  Abbott IV, 956 F.3d. at 707–08. 
157. Id. at 703. 
158. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3922.1 (3d ed. 2012). 
159.  Abbott IV, 956 F.3d at 703. 
160. Id.
 161. Id. at 704–05 (quoting In re Abbott (Abbott II), 954 F.3d 772, 784 (5th Cir. 
2020)).
162. Id. at 704–05. The dissenting judge argued that the final prong of the test might 
apply. In his view: 
[T]here was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that the enforcement 
of GA-09 as a prohibition on all three of the classes of abortion at issue was 
pretextual and motivated not by a desire to advance public health, but rather to 
reduce the number of abortions performed for its own sake. 
Id. at 734 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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patients.163  As the court had explained in an earlier round of the litigation,
its central premise was that “Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights 
may be reasonably restricted to combat a public health emergency.”164 
The Eighth Circuit also took extraordinary action in order to overturn a 
trial court for violating what the appeals court considered the mandate of
Jacobson.165  In reviewing an Arkansas order akin to that from Texas, the
court drew a two-part test from Jacobson: (1) a government response to a 
public health crisis is valid unless it “lacks a ‘real or substantial relation’ 
to the public health crisis” or (2) is “‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable 
invasion’ of the right to abortion.”166  Like the Fifth Circuit, the court was 
persuaded that banning nonessential medical procedures had a substantial 
relation to the state’s interest in public health.167 Turning to the second part
of its test, it asked whether the “directive, beyond all question, imposes an 
‘undue burden’ on a woman’s ability to choose whether to terminate 
a pre-viability pregnancy.”168  The court then faulted the district court for 
failing to give sufficient deference to the state’s view of public health 
requirements and failing to make detailed quantitative findings about the 
impact of the restriction on women seeking abortions.169 
In these cases, the State argued that abortions, like other elective
medical procedures, require contact between the patient and medical 
163. Id. at 733–34.  The court exempted that part of the trial court’s order restraining
enforcement of the order for patients “who, based on the treating physician’s medical judgment, 
would be past the legal limit for an abortion in Texas—22 weeks LMP—on April 22, 2020.”  
Id. at 723 (majority opinion).  For a critique of the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Jacobson, 
see Parmet, supra note 28, at 130. 
164. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 786.  Texas medical facilities have since been allowed to 
resume elective procedures.  See Information for Hospitals and Healthcare Professionals, 
TEX. DEP’T ST. HEALTH SERVICES, https://dshs.state.tx.us/coronavirus/healthprof.aspx# 
resume [https://perma.cc/FH58-NZV6].
165. In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1032 (8th Cir. 2020). 
166. Id. at 1028 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)). 
167. Id. at 1029. 
168. Id. at 1030 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)). 
169. Id. at 1032.  Specifically, the court did not determine the number of women that 
were seeking but unable to obtain a surgical abortion in Arkansas; how many of those women 
would be past the legal limit for obtaining an abortion by May 11; how many of those 
women would be forced to obtain a dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion instead of an 
aspiration abortion by May 11; or how many of those women would be forced to undergo 
a two-day D&E abortion instead of the one-day procedure by May 11.  Id.  That seems a lot to 
demand of the challengers under pandemic conditions, when data collection would be 
difficult.  The third member of the panel dissented without opinion.  See id. at 1033 (Loken, 
J., dissenting).  It should be noted that access to abortions in Arkansas is still limited due 
to an April 27 directive requiring those seeking “elective treatments” to have a negative 
COVID-19 test within forty-eight hours of the procedure.  Ark. Directive on Resuming 
Elective Procedures (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/
pdf/ResumeElectiveSurgeryDirectiveFINAL4.23.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML7L-CUF2]. 
850
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staff, and consume personal protective equipment (PPE) such as masks and 
gowns.170 Without the high degree of deference given by the Eighth
Circuit, the court might have been hard-pressed to reject the abortion 
provider’s counter-arguments.  The provider argued it would not deplete 
PPE supplies for COVID-19 treatment because it had its own reserves and 
that continuing a pregnancy would entail even greater contact than an 
abortion.171 Notably, healthcare experts did not consider restrictions on 
abortion medically appropriate.172 
In contrast, two other circuits struck down similar state restrictions.173 
Their perspective on Jacobson differed from that of their sister circuits.
The Sixth Circuit began by noting the factual distinctions between the two
situations: “Leave aside the myriad factual differences between this case
and Jacobson—asking a person to get a vaccination, on penalty of a small
fine, is a far cry from forcing a woman to carry an unwanted fetus against
her will for weeks, much less all the way to term . . . .”174  The court found 
the connection between the abortion ban and public health attenuated at 
best,175 and said it would “not countenance . . . the notion that COVID-19
has somehow demoted Roe and Casey to second-class rights, enforceable 
against only the most extreme and outlandish violations.”176  The Tenth 
170. See Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1023. 
171. Id. at 1029. 
172. See In re Abbott (Abbott II), 954 F.3d 772, 797 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting).  The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists released a statement 
that “abortion should not be categorized” as a “procedure[] that can be delayed during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.”  The statement emphasized . . . that abortion is “a time-sensitive 
service for which a delay of several weeks, or in some cases days, may increase the risks 
or potentially make it completely inaccessible.” Id. 
 173. See Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 929–30 (6th Cir. 2020);
Robinson v. Attorney Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2020).  A district court 
in the Tenth Circuit also struck down such an abortion restriction.  S. Wind Women’s Ctr. 
LLC v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL 1677094, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020), 
appeal dismissed, 808 F. App’x 677 (10th Cir. 2020) (order had same effect as TRO and 
was therefore non-appealable). 
174. Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 926. 
175. More still, although mandatory vaccination clearly had a “real” and
“substantial” relation to the state’s public health goals in Jacobson—indeed, as 
the Supreme Court emphasized, the importance of vaccination was widely accepted 
by the medical community—it is much harder to discern that relation here, given 
the paltry amount of PPE saved, and limited amount of in-person contact avoided, 
by halting procedural abortions for a three-week period (not to mention the lack 
of expert medical opinion in support of the State’s position).  
Id.
 176. Id. at 926–27. 
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Circuit also concluded that the government order “imposed a ‘plain, palpable
invasion of rights,’” yet had “‘no real or substantial relation’ to the state’s 
goals” under Jacobson.177 
The state orders reviewed in these cases were not identical, nor was the
evidence before the courts. Thus, it might be possible to reconcile the outcomes 
in the cases at least to a certain extent.  What clearly differed were the
lessons these courts took from Jacobson. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits 
understood Jacobson to allow remedies for only the most arbitrary or
blatant violations of constitutional rights.178  The Sixth and Tenth Circuits
saw Jacobson as shifting the balance less dramatically, providing a strong 
additional justification in favor of regulation but not expanding the level 
of deference to regulators during the pandemic.179 
B. Restrictions on Religious Gatherings 
The First Amendment guarantees the free exercise of religion.180  This
clearly frees religious doctrine and practices such as prayer from government 
regulation.181 A more difficult question is the extent to which the government
can regulate conduct that may be religiously motivated.  That question has 
arisen repeatedly during the pandemic as churches protested limitations 
on their right to conduct in-person services.182 
The Supreme Court’s view has shifted on the general issue of religious
exemptions. In a 1963 case, Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held 
that religious objectors were entitled to exemptions from general regulations
unless the government had a compelling interest in requiring compliance.183 
If that approach still held, public health restrictions would be subject to
that demanding constitutional test. 
177. Robinson, 957 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 
31 (1905)).
178. See In re Abbott (Abbott IV), 956 F.3d 696, 711 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Rutledge,
956 F.3d 1018, 1028 (8th Cir. 2020). 
179. See Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 926; S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. 
CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL 1677094, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020), appeal dismissed, 
808 Fed. Appx. 677 (10th Cir. 2020).  For a review of the litigation over abortion restrictions 
during the pandemic, see B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology 
of Restricting Abortion During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 100 
(2020) (arguing that abortions should be considered medically necessary rather than elective 
medical procedures). 
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
 181. See id.
 182. See, e.g., Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156-NT, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81962 (D. Me. May 9, 2020). 
183. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). The Court’s application of this 
test in subsequent cases is described in DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 275– 
81 (4th ed. 2014). 
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Since 1990, however, the Supreme Court has sharply limited the use of 
the compelling interest test. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court 
held that there is no free exercise exemption from state laws that apply
generally to the public.184  In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, however, the Court recognized a limit to this principle: 
the compelling interest test continued to apply when state regulations 
target religious practices.185 The regulation in that case was intentionally 
designed so that it applied only to the killing of animals in the form of ritual 
animal sacrifice, but not to the killing of animals for secular purposes.186 
Churches have brought a series of lawsuits demanding the right to conduct 
in-person services despite lockdown or social distancing rules.  The district 
courts have rejected most of those claims,187 but there have been exceptions.188 
So far, few of the cases have reached the appellate level.  Like the abortion 
cases, those cases have sparked disagreements about the scope of judicial 
review during a public health emergency.189 
The first appellate case sided with the minority of district courts finding
violations of the free exercise clause.  In Roberts v. Neace, the court addressed 
two executive orders by the Governor of Kentucky.190  One order banned
184. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). For further discussion of Smith, 
see FARBER, supra note 183, at 278–83. 
185. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 
(1993).
186. Id. at 533–34. 
187. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carney, No. 20-674-CFC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94058, 
at *1–2, *14 (D. Del. May 29, 2020); Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, No. CCB-20-
1130, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88883, at *3–4 (D. Md. May 20, 2020); Spell v. Edwards, 
No. 20-00282-BAJ-EWD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85909, at *16 (M.D. La. May 15, 2020); 
Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156-NT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81962, 
at *2, *25 (D. Me. May 9, 2020); Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77512, at *44 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020). 
188. See, e.g., Berean Baptist Church v. Cooper, No. 4:20-CV-81-D, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 86310, at *3 (E.D.N.C. May 16, 2020); First Baptist Church v. Kelly, No. 20-1102-
JWB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68267, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2020); On Fire Christian Ctr., 
Inc. v. Fischer, No. 3:20-CV-264-JRW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65924, at *2–3 (W.D. Ky. 
Apr. 11, 2020).
189. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 
2020) (Collins, J., dissenting). 
190. Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 411 (6th Cir. 2020).  The same court had previously
ruled against these bans as applied to drive-in religious services by churches.  Maryville 
Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2020).  The court observed in 
that case that “the more exceptions to a prohibition, the less likely it will count as a generally 
applicable, non-discriminatory law.”  Id. at 614 (citing Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 738 
(6th Cir. 2012)). 
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gatherings of over twenty people, including “community, civic, public,
leisure, faith-based, or sporting events.”191 Many normal business operations
such as retail sales and normal office operations were exempted.192  The
other order contained a list of “life-sustaining businesses” that were allowed 
to reopen, which did not include churches.193  The court concluded that
the ban was subject to strict scrutiny under Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye because it singled out religious activities.194  It could not survive that
scrutiny because there appeared to be many less restrictive measures that 
the State could take to achieve its compelling interest in public health.195 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit sided with the majority of district courts 
in rejecting the free exercise claim. In South Bay United Pentecostal Church
v. Newsom, the Governor of California classified churches as “higher-risk
workplaces,” meaning that they would reopen after ordinary retail and office 
operations but before concerts and other public gatherings.196  The court
observed that “[w]e’re dealing here with a highly contagious and often fatal 
disease for which there presently is no known cure,” then added, “[i]n the 
words of Justice Robert Jackson, if a ‘[c]ourt does not temper its doctrinaire 
logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill 
of Rights into a suicide pact.’”197 
The dissenting judge rejected the State’s argument that Jacobson modified
the applicable constitutional standards, though the existence of a pandemic
191. Ky. Pub. Health Order No. 20200319 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://governor.ky.gov/ 
attachments/20200319_Order_Mass-Gatherings.pdf [https://perma.cc/586R-UYY3].
192. Id. 
193. Ky. Exec. Order No. 2020-257 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://governor.ky.gov/
attachments/20200325_Executive-Order_2020-257_Healthy-at-Home.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DR6Y-WPY5].
194. Roberts, 958 F.3d at 413 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 553 (1993)). 
195. See id. at 415. 
The question is whether the orders amount to “the least restrictive means” of serving 
these laudable goals.  That’s a difficult hill to climb, and it was never meant to 
be anything less.  There are plenty of less restrictive ways to address these public-
health issues.  Why not insist that the congregants adhere to social-distancing 
and other health requirements and leave it at that—just as the Governor has done 
for comparable secular activities?  Or perhaps cap the number of congregants 
coming together at one time?  If the Commonwealth trusts its people to innovate 
around a crisis in their professional lives, surely it can trust the same people to 
do the same things in the exercise of their faith. 
Id. (citation omitted).
196. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 2020)
(Collins, J., dissenting). 
197. Id. at 939 (majority opinion) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
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might be relevant to applying those standards.198  The dissenter argued 
that the Governor had discriminated against religious conduct “by explicitly 
and categorically assigning all in-person ‘religious services’ to a future 
Phase 3—without any express regard to the number of attendees, the size 
of the space, or the safety protocols followed in such services.”199  In the
dissenter’s view, “[b]y regulating the specific underlying risk-creating behaviors, 
rather than banning the particular religious setting within which they occur, 
the State could achieve its ends in a manner that is the ‘least restrictive 
way of dealing with the problem at hand.’”200 
Having been rebuffed by the court of appeals, the church turned to the
Supreme Court for relief.201  In opposing the stay, the State provided
evidence that public gatherings such as indoor church services pose 
a heightened risk of coronavirus spread.202  The Court denied the motion 
198. Id. at 942 (Collins, J., dissenting). The judge’s discussion of this issue is worth
quotation:
Nothing in Jacobson supports the view that an emergency displaces normal 
constitutional standards.  Rather, Jacobson provides that an emergency may 
justify temporary constraints within those standards.  As the Second Circuit has 
recognized, Jacobson merely rejected what we would now call a “substantive 
due process” challenge to a compulsory vaccination requirement, holding that 
such a mandate “was within the State’s police power.” 
Id. (quoting Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Zucht
v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (“Jacobson ‘settled that it is within the police power of 
a state to provide for compulsory vaccination.’”)). 
199. Id. at 945. 
200. Id. at 946 (quoting Roberts, 958 F.3d at 416). 
201. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
202. See Opposition of State Respondents to Emergency Application for Writ of 
Injunction at 8–9, S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) 
(No. 19A1044).  The State’s filing in South Bay Pentecostal summarizes some of the evidence: 
In the view of state public-health officials, large public gatherings pose a 
heightened risk of spread because attendees are “stationary in close quarters for
extended periods of time.”  Moreover, at religious services, “congregants are often 
speaking aloud and singing, which increases the danger that infected individuals 
will project respiratory droplets that contain the virus,” “thereby infect[ing]
others.” As James Watt, M.D., M.P.H., an epidemiologist with the California
Department of Health, explained in a declaration submitted to the district court,
there “have been multiple reports of sizable to large gatherings such as religious
services, choir practices, funerals, and parties resulting in significant spread of
COVID-19.”  Defendants pointed, for example, to a worship service in Sacramento
tied to 71 COVID-19 cases; a choir practice in Seattle linked to 32 cases; a
Kentucky church revival tied to 28 cases; and a religious service in South Korea 
where over 5,000 cases were traced back to a single infected individual in attendance.
Id. 
 855










   
  
       





       
  
  
   
 
 
   
  
for preliminary relief without an opinion,203 but two separate opinions
were filed in support of and against the denial.204 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion explaining his reasons 
for denying relief.205  According to Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme 
Court grants temporary injunctive relief only when “the legal rights at 
issue are ‘indisputably clear’ and, even then, ‘sparingly and only in the 
most critical and exigent circumstances.’”206  He emphasized that the
“precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should 
be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter 
subject to reasonable disagreement.”207  Quoting language from Jacobson, 
he stressed that the Constitution “principally entrusts ‘the safety and the 
health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States 
‘to guard and protect.’”208  Moreover, “[w]hen those officials ‘undertake
to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,’ their 
latitude ‘must be especially broad.’”209  In contrast, the federal judiciary
“lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health 
and is not accountable to the people.”210  The Chief Justice found it unlikely 
that a case decided under that standard would be “indisputably clear.”211 
Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas.212 
Justice Kavanaugh could find no reason why churches should not be treated
the same as “comparable secular businesses” such as “factories, offices, 
supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, pharmacies, shopping malls, pet 
grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis dispensaries.”213 
Perhaps this statement is a sign that comparability is to some degree in the 
eyes of the beholder. Some observers might have found it incongruous to 
say that businesses like pet grooming shops are comparable to churches, 
whether in the risks of spreading the virus or in other respects. It would
also seem that the dissenters gave no deference to the State’s medical
203. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613. 
204. See id. at 1613–14. 
205. Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
206. Id. (quoting STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 17.4 (11th 
ed. 2019)). 
207. Id.
 208. Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905)).
209. Id. (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)).
210. Id. at 1613–14. 
211. Id. at 1614. 
212. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The same four Justices who dissented in South
Bay United Pentecostal Church also dissented in a later case involving a similar restriction 
on church services in Nevada.  See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 
19A1070, 2020 WL 4251360, at *1, *6 (U.S. July 24, 2020). 
213. S. Bay Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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judgments nor to the evidence that churches have been sources of serious 
outbreaks. 
As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided another 
request for emergency relief from restrictions on religious activities 
during the pandemic, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo.214 
The Governor had imposed stringent limits on religious gatherings in
certain areas experiencing disease outbreaks, including a requirement that 
religious gatherings in certain areas be limited to ten people.215  In a per
curiam opinion, the Court held that the challenge to the restriction was 
likely to prevail, citing several factors.  First, the restrictions were far harsher 
than those on secular businesses, even though the religious institutions in 
question had “admirable safety records.”216  For that reason, strict scrutiny
was required.217  The Court found it “hard to believe that admitting more
than 10 people in a 1,000 seat church or 400-seat synagogue would create 
a more serious health risk than many other activities that the State 
allows[,]” especially given that the restrictions were much more stringent 
than those applied by other jurisdictions.218  Concurring, Justice Gorsuch
said that classifying religious activities as “non-essential” violated the 
Free Exercise Clause.219  He viewed Jacobson as applying at most only to
limited restrictions on rights that were not expressly protected by the 
Constitution. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a more cautious concurrence, 
stressing that the restrictions before the Court went “much further” than 
those in previous cases.220  He agreed, however, that federal courts “must 
afford substantial deference to state and local authorities about how best 
to balance competing policy considerations during the pandemic.”221 
Although he dissented on procedural grounds, Roberts agreed with
Kavanaugh that the New York measures “raise serious concerns under the 
214. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, No. 20A87, 2020 WL
6948354 (U.S. Nov. 25, 2020) (per curiam).  In the interim between South Bay United 
Pentecostal and Roman Catholic Diocese, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg had died and been 
replaced by Justice Amy Coney Barrett. 
215. Id. at *1–2. 
216. Id. at *2.  The Court apparently ignored arguments that secular businesses generally 
involve smaller risks because of the different nature of the activities involved.  It also 
ignored the difficulty of tailoring pandemic restrictions to the particular safety records of 
individual religious groups. 
217. Id.
 218. Id. 
219. Id. at *4 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
220.  Id. at *7 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
221. Id. at *8. 
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Constitution” and were distinguishable from those in prior cases.222 Writing 
for himself and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, Justice Breyer agreed with 
Roberts on the procedural point but argued that the Court had given insufficient 
deference to the government in an area requiring quick responses based 
on rapidly changing circumstances and expert medical judgment.223 
The majority opinion did not discuss the reasons why localities were 
placed in these high-risk categories or the justifications given by the state
for imposing such harsh restrictions.  This may in part reflect the dangers 
of making important decisions in truncated summary proceedings, without 
giving the parties full hearings.  The majority seemed content to apply
“common sense,” rather than medical evidence, in assessing risks.  It may
also have been misled by terminology in thinking that “essential” activities 
were considered by the State more necessary than others, whereas for many 
activities the distinctions were based on levels of risk.  Still, in the end, 
the majority did recognize the need for deference to public health authorities,
and the case may be distinguishable in the future because of the unusual
severity of the restrictions.
IV. RETHINKING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A PANDEMIC
The opinions in recent abortion and religion cases reveal disparate 
views of Jacobson. Some courts view Jacobson as creating a special
constitutional test for situations like the pandemic.224 Under this test, a
state regulation is valid if it has some relationship to public health and
does not blatantly violate any specific fundamental right.225  At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, some courts view Jacobson merely as emphasizing 
the strength of the government’s interest in controlling the pandemic.226 
The cases in the middle vary, but they generally seem to give the government
a thumb on the scale in applying the standard constitutional tests.227 
The view that Jacobson establishes a special test for public health
emergencies does not seem consistent with history.  As we saw in Part II, 
222. Id. at *9 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
223. Id. at *10–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
224. See, e.g., In re Abbott (Abbott II), 954 F.3d 772, 785–86 (5th Cir. 2020); In re
Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1028–30 (8th Cir. 2020). 
225. See Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 786–88; Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1028–30.
 226. See, e.g., Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 924–27 (6th Cir. 2020); 
Robinson v. Attorney Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 2020).
227. See, e.g., Tabernacle Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-CV-00033-
GFVT, 2020 WL 2305307, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2020); S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC
v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL 1932900, at *1–2, *8–9 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 20, 2020); 
Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19CV365-MHT, 2020 WL 1847128, at *8–12 (M.D. Ala. 
Apr. 12, 2020). 
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the case was decided nearly at the same time as Lochner.228  Like Lochner, 
it reflects a general view of how courts should review regulations.229 
During the Lochner era, Jacobson was commonly cited to support arguments
for upholding regulations—not just in public health emergencies, but in
more routine contexts.230  As we have seen, the Court has treated it as standing
for a cluster of propositions since the Lochner era ended, such as the 
permissibility of vaccination mandates, with or without an epidemic,231 
the need for government leeway in dealing with scientific uncertainty,232 
and the strength of the government’s interest in public safety.233 
Thus, the use of Jacobson as a special test for constitutionality during 
public health or other emergencies seems unsupported by history—at least 
in the Supreme Court—or by the way the Court has treated issues of 
similar urgency in the area of national security.  Yet the opposing view, 
which treats public health emergencies like garden-variety constitutional 
cases, also seems wrong. Contagious diseases pose unique challenges.234 
In particular, contagious diseases have the ability to quickly jump from a 
few individual cases to a major health crisis.235  The speed and extent of
the threat has several consequences.  The government must formulate 
responses quickly, based on incomplete information, and in the face of 
scientific uncertainty.236  Because of the high costs of inaction, the response 
must also be highly precautionary.237  The upshot is that the government
may not be in a position to make fine-grained distinctions or to provide 
228. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra Part II. 
230. See supra notes 83–87, 91–95 and accompanying text. 
231. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922). 
232. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007). 
233. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582–83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (citing Jacobson as the basis 
for a public safety exception from religious freedom); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
403 (1963).
234. For a discussion of how these challenges require that courts respect the need for 
flexible government responses, see Jeff Thaler, The Next Surge Is Coming: What Can Governors 
Constitutionally Do to Prevent More COVID-19 Deaths and Cases This Fall? (Aug. 14, 
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604706 [https://perma.cc/EJ2J-
J69L].
235. See, e.g., Steven Sanche et al., High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1470, 
1470 (2020), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/7/pdfs/20-0282.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Q66F-5ZBW].
236. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 4.
 237. See id.
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detailed supporting evidence and explanation.  Applying the usual modes 
of judicial review is asking more precision and deliberation from these 
emergency decisions than the government can realistically supply. Given 
these realities, the “business as usual” approach adopted by some courts, 
including the dissenters in South Bay Pentecostal, seems too grudging and 
is also inconsistent with the treatment of similar issues in national security 
cases.238 
The government clearly has an especially powerful interest in acting in
the face of an epidemic.  The most comparable situation would appear to 
involve national security measures during wartime.  In that situation, national
interests of the highest order are also in play.  The Court’s treatment of
these national security measures is instructive. It does not appear, however, 
that the Supreme Court has ever announced a special standard for constitutional 
review in such cases.
For instance, during World War I, the Court took the position that the 
parameters of permissible speech were smaller in wartime, but that was 
because of a changed situation, not because the test for constitutionality 
was different.239  Consider the following language from an early opinion
by Justice Holmes upholding such a conviction: 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a question
of proximity and degree.  When a nation is at war, many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured . . . .240 
Note that the first sentence states a test that applies “in every case,” while 
the second sentence says applying the test leads to different results in 
wartime.241 
238. Lindsay Wiley and Stephen Vladeck argue against suspending judicial review 
in emergencies such as the pandemic and in favor of applying ordinary judicial review.  
See Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: 
The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 182–83 (2020).  
To the extent that they are arguing for application of the normal constitutional tests rather 
than across-the-board deference to government actions, their conclusion seems to be 
correct.  Korematsu v. United States is a vivid demonstration of why courts should not 
abandon their scrutiny of government actions during emergencies.  Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944).  If by ordinary judicial review they mean to call for 
searching inquiry into the factual bases for government actions, that approach seems too 
likely to interfere with the need for immediate response to a rapidly shifting situation under 
conditions of uncertainty. 
239. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
240. Id.
 241. Id.  This clearly was not a blank check for government suppression of speech. 
In the course of upholding a conviction under this test in a later case, Holmes complained 
that the absence of a full factual record made it impossible to determine whether the 
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The test applied in free speech cases has changed over the years.242  But
whatever the current test may be, the Court continues to apply that test in 
national security cases as well as other cases.243  For instance, in Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, the plaintiffs challenged a statute that illegalized
material support to international terrorist groups, as applied to communication 
activities undertaken in coordination with one such group.244  The Court 
rejected the argument that a lower level of scrutiny should apply.245 The
central issue in the case was whether speech-based assistance to a terrorist 
organization’s non-violent activities could be distinguished from assistance 
to its terrorist activities.246  The Court rejected this distinction, based in
part on its own review of evidence in the record.247  The Court also stressed 
the need for judicial deference “[g]iven the sensitive interests in national 
security and foreign affairs at stake.”248 
Some of the reasons the Holder Court gave for deference apply equally 
to public health emergencies.  In the national security setting, the Court 
said, the government must “confront evolving threats in an area where
information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct 
difficult to assess.”249  The Court continued that “[i]n this context, conclusions
must often be based on informed judgment rather than concrete evidence, 
and that reality affects what we may reasonably insist on from the 
Government.”250 
Admittedly, there are differences between national security and public 
health threats. National security information often cannot be revealed to 
the public, which is rarely true of public health information.251  Moreover, 
foreign and military affairs have long been thought to be within the special 
authority of the President.252  These differences point toward greater judicial
deference in national security cases than public health cases.  On the other 
defendant’s remarks really did pose a threat.  Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209
(1919).
242. See Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech
Balancing in the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 187, 190–91 (2001). 
243. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010). 
244.  Id. at 7–8. 
245. Id. at 28. 
246. Id. at 14–15. 
247. Id. at 33–39. 
248. Id. at 36. 
249. Id. at 34. 
250. Id. at 34–35. 
251. See Classified Nat’l Sec. Info., 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 707 (Dec. 29, 2010). 
252. See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 206–14. 
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hand, national security cases often lack the urgency of disease outbreaks.253 
That difference could justify a more demanding standard of review for
national security decisions.  Furthermore, public health emergencies are 
temporary whereas national security threats can last years or decades—
consider the Cold War or the current terrorism issue.254  Thus, restrictions
imposed in an epidemic are likely to entail briefer and therefore less serious 
invasions of constitutional rights. 
These considerations seem offsetting and suggest that, on balance, 
courts should treat public health emergencies much like national security 
threats for constitutional purposes. This means that normal constitutional 
tests should continue to apply.  However, in determining whether a regulation
is tailored to the government’s interest in combatting the epidemic, the
courts should take into account the government’s need to take immediate 
precautionary actions under conditions of high uncertainty.  Thus, something
like the Holder255 approach is appropriate. It is not surprising that Chief 
Justice Roberts, who wrote Holder,256 advocated a similar approach in South 
Bay Pentecostal.257 
In principle, this additional degree of deference should function within
the setting of whatever standard generally applies to the constitutional right
in question. For courts that are committed to treating Jacobson as providing
a special standard of review, the analogy to national security cases could 
be treated as an interpretation of the “real or substantial relation” and 
“palpable invasion” prongs of Jacobson.258 
253. One metric of a situation’s gravity—fatalities—shows that disease outbreaks 
can present decision-makers with much greater “urgency” than threats to national security.  
Compare Cases and Deaths in the U.S., CENTERS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/us-cases-deaths.html
[https://perma.cc/D5ZX-BMYJ] (reporting 4,542,579 coronavirus cases and 152,870
attributable deaths in the United States as of August 1, 2020), with Hannah Ritchie et al., 
Terrorism, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Nov. 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism [https:// 
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Either way, it will not always be easy to balance the need for deference 
in an emergency and the court’s duty to protect constitutional rights.
Unfortunately, there is no magic formula for striking the balance.  At least,
however, courts can steer clear of the extremes, neither giving the government
a blank check nor hamstringing its emergency response. 
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